No, he is an idiot and He and SPA is being used by Maoists. I found folowing article quite intersting.
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http://www.losangeleschronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=9146 NEPAL: Hope is Not a Method
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Media Communications Center
May 7, 2006
NEPAL: Hope is Not a Method
Dr Thomas A. Marks
Dr. Marks is a political risk consultant based in Honolulu, Hawaii and a frequent visitor to Nepal. He has authored a number of benchmark works on Maoist insurgency.
As Nepal moves towards a new order, its governing parliamentarians would do well to heed that most fundamental of maxims: hope is not a method.
To date, events have gone reasonably smoothly, but there continue to be ominous signs that a rougher road lies ahead. Not least of the elements for concern is that which has been at the heart of the matter all along, the motives of the Maoist insurgents.
Contrary to much ill-considered opinionating, the Maoists have not opted for peace in our time. Instead, their forces remain intact, even as they encourage the government to dismantle the only intact force that stands between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), and its ability to work its will, the security forces.
Situation
Its grudging moves towards negotiations notwithstanding, the Maoists have been very consistent. In their verbiage, in their briefings to their cadres, and even in their interviews given to members of the international media, they make clear that they do not accept the present state of things. Instead, they are convinced that they are riding the "will of history" that will see the complete ouster of the old-order.
They view the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) present course as an error of major proportions and are fearful that they – “the people” – will be "betrayed." They certainly do not accept parliamentary democracy as the end-state, unless it emerges in a form of which they approve.
What stands behind their present tactical maneuvering is a willingness to go with the flow so long as the river does not leap its banks. If the SPA will do the work armed rebellion could not accomplish – especially, dismantle the security forces and do away with even a figurehead monarchy – that is agreeable. But one cannot expect them, if things do not go their way, simply to shrug and say they had their moment.
There is a veritable cottage industry of historical falsification abounding, in Nepal and abroad at the moment, which states the Maoists turned to insurgency only because they were not allowed to participate in parliamentary elections (as Masal). That is false. The machinations that led to one wing of Masal being allowed to run using party identification were an intra-Masal squabble, not something the system engineered.
Likewise, the outrageous claim that the monarchy is somehow responsible for the violence of the Maoists is as astonishing as it is absurd. The Maoists first systematically laid waste to Nepal and its weak democracy, then systematically carried out a campaign to claim the reigning monarch had killed his brother and engineered what they, the Maoists, in fact had done – destroy Nepal.
Having turned to armed insurgency, CPN(M) systematically destroyed the structure of the state, in the process eliminating all who opposed the local presence of the Maoists. Non-activists who tried to compile statistics were themselves assassinated.
Having gained control of widespread areas, which they will continue to control during “elections,” no matter for what purpose those elections are held, they are not about to allow their rivals to freely contest within "liberated space."
This is classic "machine politics," as the Maoists claim the Nepali Congress (NC) and Unified Marxist Leninists (UML) have been playing all these years. Since UML buys into this logic, at least partially, it is willing to front for the Maoists. The extremist wing of the UML does more than front -- it works with the Maoists.
Role of India
Ironically, anti-communist India has ended up letting its own Marxists have their moment by unduly influencing New Delhi's Nepal policy. This should not surprise, given the realities of coalition politics.
The ruling United Progressive Alliance (a coalition led by Congress) has roughly 218 seats versus the 189 of the National Democratic Alliance (a coalition led by the BJP) -- of the total 543. With 71 independents, the 65 votes of the Left Front -- 43 of those 65 votes are CPI(Marxist) -- are what allow the UPA to rule (even in a hypothetical worst case scenario, 283-260). That is why the demands of the CPI(M) have been acceded to, and that is why CPI(M) figures such as Sitaram Yechury have become regular visitors to Kathmandu as they conduct the Indian left’s “foreign policy within a foreign policy.”
Actions of Congress Party itself need little explaining -- this is the party that absorbed Sikkim, and that sees the Nepali King in the same light as the deposed Rajas of the princely states. This is the party that yet contains a wing that sees itself as heirs to "the Great Game." In their assessment, the king of Nepal should have gone the way of the Rajahs "back then," but the business of cleaning out the dead wood on the subcontinent was not finished.
The result, as needs little recounting, has been regular and consistent interjection of India into the affairs of Nepal. Having done this yet one more time, in the present crisis, India now expects Nepali politics to function as that of a union territory in all but formal status.
This issue is not one that need detain any analysis at this moment. It will ultimately be decided, one way or another, as it was in Sri Lanka, by nationalism of the target state. Nepali nationalism, to be sure, is something, which has rarely reared its head in anything save platitudes about "never having been a colony." In fact, Nepal is as thorough a colony as ever there was (of India and of the international community through its utter dependence upon external aid).
Still, to be clear: first, India has no desire to become bogged down in the quicksand of Nepal, so having "democratic allies" in power is the proper route to realization of its geo-strategic designs; second, there is a strong wing of Indian politics that sees the present policy towards Nepal as misguided, counterproductive, and downright dangerous, given India's own Maoist threat. The claim that there are no connections between the Nepali and Indian Maoists is falsified by a wealth of evidence, not least the pronouncements and actions of the Nepali Maoists before they became more media savvy.
The threat to Nepali sovereignty, then, is not from India per se but from the present situation that India has "enabled." Its view is that it can "handle" the situation. This remains to be seen -- just as India proved quite incapable of "handling" the Tamil insurgents.
Internal Issues
The most pressing danger, at this juncture, is that SPA, dominated by NC and UML, will revert to form (on full display during the dozen or so years of full democracy) and lead Nepal into a "Kerensky moment" for the Maoists, as occurred for the Bolsheviks in Russia of 1917-18. The Leninists were not the strongest party in post-Czarist Russia, only the party with a preponderance of force at the decisive point(s). This allowed them to gain control of the state and then to do what was necessary to consolidate their hold.
This is also how Hitler consolidated his hold on Germany, despite having only one-third of the parliament (Reichstag). Further, it is what the Sandinistas did in post-Somoza Nicaragua. One already sees the Maoist thugs threatening even UML politicians (who, in any case, have always been on the cutting edge as victims of the Maoists).
What all three of the cases just named share is that the security forces had fallen apart. This is not the case in Nepal. The key, therefore, is to make the new-order understand that the security forces have every intention and desire to serve democracy -- but that they will not stand by and see compromised restored democracy and Nepali sovereignty compromised. What they desire is what they have fought for -- a viable parliamentary democracy.
Already, the Maoists have stated repeatedly that they have other goals: trials for those central to the old-order, especially for the monarch and the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) officer corps (the Maoist leadership has asserted both of these goals in its less guarded moments). This is also what they have been saying to their cadres.
They have rejected integration into the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) by any name and demanded a new force, which they will dominate by default. This is just how the scenario played itself out in Nicaragua, the result being the Sandinista dictatorship, which rapidly produced its own counterrevolutionary insurgency by abusing the people. (Contrary to the hoary left-wing myth, the CIA could not even arm all the contras, so abundant was the influx of peasant manpower demanding the right to resist the Managua Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.)
Status of the Security Forces
In this situation, what is both puzzling and counterproductive is how little realistic consideration has emerged concerning the future of the security forces, of which the RNA is the dominant element.
This is puzzling, because the security forces are quite intact and – contrary to yet another theme pushed by both activist elements of the new regime and their international activist backers – exercised remarkable restraint during the recent upheaval. Lathi charges are not semiautomatic volleys, and the latter did not occur.
It is counterproductive for the same reasons: there are at least 150,000 armed government security forces in completely intact units. It is naïve to assume that they – and their compatriots in the other two forces, the Armed Police Force, or APF, and the Civil Police, or CP – are going to march off to oblivion, surrender, or slaughter.
The latter two, to be clear, are the Maoist position, and they expect to extract such from the ruling SPA as the Maoist price of “nonviolent participation” in the state. To judge that this inevitably will lead to confrontation requires no analytical acumen, simply looking at the Nepali security forces with clear eyes.
What is now on the field is a force quite different from that, which entered the conflict in November 2001, when RNA was attacked by the Maoists. This is especially so in the key middle grades of RNA and extending even to the younger brigadiers. It is also true in APF, perhaps to a lesser extent in NP. It is RNA, which is of particular interest.
RNA’s “field elements” accept parliamentary supremacy and seek a more professional, “21st Century military.” Critical in this respect is a functioning Ministry of Defence. Frequently (e.g., as in Sri Lanka), the Prime Minister will also be the Minister of Defence, with a Deputy Minister actually handling the day-to-day business of running the armed forces. This is a level of detail that does not concern RNA now. Officers know there are numerous friendly states with extensive experience in implementing and consolidating the proper mechanisms.
Many of these younger RNA officers have even considered the passing of the monarchy, but they are worldly enough to see that this leaves open the question of what institution or figure would serve the referee's position (e.g., India has a president; many former Commonwealth states have a Governor General; the US has its Senate; Britain, the House of Lords). Hence, they believe it is preferable that a constitutional monarchy remain.
What they do not accept is the position demanded by the Maoists and their left wing allies: "replacing" one force by another, or of "purging" one force only to install the cadres of another. Reconciliation, to their mind, demands amalgamation, even if this is accompanied by reduction in overall numbers.
For their part, APF and CP are critical to the normal functioning of the state. Under no circumstances will any force accept being disbanded in favor of Maoist replacements. To do so would guarantee left-wing dictatorship.
Operational Matters
Ironically, whatever the precise manner in which events unfold, the sitting government is bound to find, in the months ahead, normal policing and security duties will assume heightened importance. A clear understanding must be worked out by the government as to what is expected to arrest a dangerous societal drift that has set in. Armed thugs, often claiming to be representing “the people” but invariably cadres of Maoist front organizations, roam all major population centers in Nepal and must be brought within the normal rule of law.
This is a job particularly of the police, supported by the APF, but it is inevitable that RNA will be involved. The present situation, to include the widespread threatening of individuals and institutions, cannot go unchecked.
Within the forces themselves, leave and training will assume heightened importance during the transition. The latter must be done in a way so as to maintain unit integrity and readiness but not be confrontational. Best way to do this is to integrate representatives of the local civil authority into coordinating bodies.
Politically, RNA is confronted with a Faustian bargain: It must serve the state even with the knowledge that the unity of SPAM (Seven Party Alliance + the Maoists) depends upon the SPA placating the M. The Maoists see the victory as theirs and see themselves as dictating the terms of surrender -- and see only trials for those who have resisted them. Hence, the security forces must keep order even as they are plotted against (in certain circles) and held up as a bargaining chip (in other circles).
Their logical advocates, the Indians, who have the most to lose from a Maoist-dominated Nepal, remain, as noted above, very much an unknown element, given the array of actors waging mini-foreign policies. One factor has not changed as any perusal of large segments of the Indian press reveals: New Delhi has been ill-informed by a good fraction of its so-called “Nepal experts,” in just the manner it was led astray, two decades ago, by its “Sri Lanka experts.”
It cannot be said that Indian analysts have developed much actual knowledge of the workings of Nepali Maoism. The dominant position is that the CPN(M) can be bought off or simply directed – an astonishing position given what India seems to have realized quite belatedly about the Stalinist, anti-democratic essence of its own Maoists.
CPI(M), in particular, has little understanding of Nepali insurgent ground realities. The Indian left-wing political pilgrims to Nepal deal with their opposite numbers in the UML. If they meet a “Maoist,” they deal with personalities of their “own stratum," who can be as engaging and sophisticated as any. They do not deal with what is in the hills, thus gaining no comprehension that there is an organization of LTTE clones, every bit as dogmatic and ruthless.
For those who have dealt with the Tamil insurgents, one conclusion is salient: orientation of manpower is never the issue in a situation such as this. It is leaders who are the lynchpin. It is insurgent leaders who have produced the endless cycle of insurgent brutality in Sri Lanka, a struggle that has long since seen its original causes vanish.
The situation is quite similar in Nepal. It is the Maoist leaders who are following an ideological play-book. Their followers are thrown up by local grievances. Maoist manpower is just as eager for "peace" as anyone else, but they expect to get something out of their campaign. They have been told consistently that the new order will belong to them and will bring justice and prosperity. There is no way to do that in the short term except by taking from the old and giving to the new.
That this is playing a losing hand has been made clear in study after study, most recently by the simple calculations of Dr Steve Gorzula. As he notes, divide the arable land of Nepal (22,627 km2) by the population (28 million in July 2006 estimates), and the result is a society that has exceeded the carrying capacity of the land. Lip-serve is paid to the only real possibility, development of hydropower, and the result is a vacuum into which Maoist coercive utopian solutions have no competitors.
What is to be Done?
Certainly Lenin, who set forth the query in his famous work, would be proud of his Maoist pupils. On the side of democracy, there is little worthy of praise. The stormy course ahead, though, will require more steady seamanship than has hitherto been demonstrated in the short history of Nepali democracy. More than “hope (it all works out)” will be required.
The role of the security forces will be paramount, for they are the only guarantee that Maoist violence will not be the trump card. Thus normal functioning of those security forces must be maintained at all costs, so as to avoid demoralization and possible desertion. Clear explanations of what is happening are imperative, with the emphasis upon "transition to parliamentary supremacy."
Any impression of "defeat" must be banished, despite the concerted efforts of the left-wing to push this claim to front position in the ongoing struggle for control of the narrative describing recent events. Already, the Maoists claim their revolutionary forces were key (with their cadres inciting violence and caching explosives in urban areas).
Of course, it was not the revolutionary project that emerged victorious, but the demand for participation and results. "Reform," then, must be the order of the day, as has long been called for by all interested parties.
"Reform" is not a word in the Maoist vocabulary, so forces of actual democracy (as opposed to “people’s democracy”) will be called upon to face the inevitable backlash. It is for the politicians to deal with this reality, but the security forces will be their shield.
It is possible that international mediation and even involvement may create new possibilities. For the moment, however, the Maoists have no intention of participating in a "new" version of the old-order. They are demanding and expecting that a constitutional convention will deliver a people's republic in form if not in immediate practice. They are determined to exact vengeance.
They are not, in other words, seeking "democracy" as we know the word. There is a strong thread of thought which claims the Maoists will choose the path trod by the "other" insurgent groups in Sri Lanka (e.g., PLOT, TELO, EPRLF), groups that agreed, with certain misgivings, to work within the system. More likely, is that the Maoists will go the way of LTTE, which moved after each hopeful pause to resume its revolutionary project.
It hardly needs highlighting that such a course of action by the Maoists would put them squarely at odds with the desires of the Nepali masses – just as LTTE cannot today be said to represent much more than the aspirations of its rump state. If the CPN(M) is astute, it will realize this.
Unfortunately, historically does not provide grounds for optimism. There is no Maoist insurgency that has displayed such foresight. Neither do operational realities provide any more hope: the Maoists are not in any way standing down.
The up side? If the Maoists move as driven by their hate-filled ideology and resume their struggle. they will find themselves just where LTTE does – on the wrong side of history and facing a reasonably united, democratic society, amply assisted by friendly powers -- to include India.
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