The resilient Brahmin

By Debashish Mukerji

It was called a watershed in post-independent India's history. Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh's decision in 1990 to implement the Mandal Commission recommendations was hailed and reviled with equal fervour. While the upper castes, especially Brahmins, saw it as the death knell of their aspirations, the backward castes and Dalits believed it was the gateway to a brave new world, free of Brahminical hegemony. Upper caste students demonstrated noisily, immolated themselves in protest, but in vain. Four years later, after an injunction against it was removed following a historic Supreme Court verdict, the Mandal recommendations entered the statute books.

But 12 years after the announcement-and eight since the judgment-both Brahmin fears and backward caste hopes appear to have been belied. Be it in national or north Indian politics, the bureaucracy or elsewhere, Brahmins are far from marginalised. Nine of the 12 years have seen Brahmin Prime Ministers at the helm (P.V. Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee); for five years there was also a Brahmin President (Shankar Dayal Sharma). The current Lok Sabha Speaker Manohar Joshi is a Brahmin, as are three chief ministers (of Uttaranchal, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal).

The Brahmin roll call among top civil servants is even more impressive: National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra, Cabinet Secretary Kamal Pande, Home Secretary N. Gopalaswamy, Finance Secretary S. Narayanan and Central Vigilance Commissioner P. Shanker are the leading lights among two dozen Brahmin secretaries at the Centre. The chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, Gen. S. Padmanabhan and Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy, are Brahmins. Brahmins proliferating in top corporate positions, or straddling the heights of the culture and entertainment worlds are too many to name. Why, four permanent fixtures in the Indian cricket team-Sourav Ganguly, Sachin Tendulkar, Rahul Dravid and Anil Kumble-are Brahmins!

The Brahmin domination of Hindu society goes back a long, long way. The Purusasukta legend-claiming the Brahmin emerged from the head of Purusa, the primeval being, while the Kshatriya came out of Purusa's shoulders, the Vaishya from his thighs and the Shudra from his feet-first mentioned in the Rig Veda, aptly symbolises the unquestioned sway the Brahmin has held for millennia. But in the twentieth century there occurred a curious, sweeping, worldwide reversal of long-cherished values: suddenly elitism-like empire and patriarchy-became a dirty word.

Egalitarianism was the new ideal, and Brahmins, like traditional elites everywhere, found themselves under attack for having suppressed and oppressed the toiling masses. In the first half of the century the scheduled castes asserted themselves under Babasaheb Ambedkar; in south India, particularly Tamil Nadu, the backward castes rallied behind 'Periyar' E.V. Ramaswami Naicker. Half a century later, with the Mandal announcement, the backward upsurge reached north India.

Simultaneously, Kanshi Ram's Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), slowly and painstakingly accreting support for years, suddenly grew wings in Uttar Pradesh, giving the scheduled castes-now renamed Dalits-a voice they had never before had. And as the anti-Mandal agitation failed, as the anti-upper caste, anti-Brahmin rhetoric of the BSP-and to a lesser degree, of the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)-grew shriller, it was believed by many that the Brahmin had had his day. "The upper castes did feel besieged," said Yogendra Yadav, political scientist and psephologist.

In south India, undoubtedly, lasting changes did occur, rendering Brahmins irrelevant in politics. In the bureaucracy, too, Brahmins have been reduced to a minority, but even that minority-as the list of top bureaucrats reveals-is not doing all that badly. Besides, south Indian Brahmins continue to thrive in the private sector, in the arts and related areas, in new fields of technology: the Indian contribution to software development, feted worldwide, is primarily the achievement of south Indian Brahmins.

In the north, Brahmins have held their own even more successfully. In the Hindi belt they still matter in politics, they still dominate the bureaucracy, they still possess sizeable land and economic resources. Indeed, it is their opponents' fire which has dimmed; the anti-Brahmin sloganeering of the nineties is no longer heard. Even Kanshi Ram and Mayawati now explicitly seek votes not just from the 'bahujan samaj' but from all sections of society, including the upper castes. Said sociologist Dhirubhai Sheth of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies: "Brahmins have shown an unexpected degree of resilience."

How did the Brahmin become so powerful in the first place? Recent research on caste questions if they were, in fact, all that important. The central thesis of Dipankar Gupta's Interrogating Caste, for instance, is that there was no single caste hierarchy, which was universally acknowledged and accepted by everyone in the caste system. "Every caste has always considered itself superior to every other caste," said Gupta, who teaches sociology at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. "But the poorer castes, lacking wealth and power, never dared to openly say so!"

Gupta maintained that only those Brahmins who had plenty of wealth and land were dominant. "The Brahmins who were simply pujaris were not particularly revered," he said. The notion of unchallenged Brahmin superiority in ancient and medieval times, suggested Gupta, was a construct of the British. "When they took over the country they wanted to understand and codify the Indian caste system. They turned to the Brahmins, among the few literate groups then, for information. The Brahmins naturally gave them only their own point of view!"

The more conventional position, however, insists that all Brahmins-not only the rich, powerful ones-were accorded immense respect in bygone times. And that was because, trained in ritual, they were believed to possess occult powers. F.E. Pargiter writes in Ancient Indian Historical Tradition: "The original Brahmins were not so much priests as adept in matters supernatural, masters of magico-religious forces, wizards, medicine men." As much as he feared the Kshatriya's sword, the common man must have been terrified of the Brahmin's capacity to cast spells.

Whatever their position in the distant past, there is no doubt that Brahmins reached the zenith of their prestige under British rule. "The British needed a class of scribes to man their lower bureaucratic positions," said Gupta. "In those days the only literate castes were the Brahmins and Kayasthas, and these were the ones the British recruited. These salaried positions gave the Brahmins extraordinary power over Indian society."

Makes you wonder if caste is fast becoming a state of mind - at least in some places and scenarios.

Just a thought.

I don't know but somehow I feel we are now going to be in a new world where we will have to give semblance of meaning to our existence and the complexes arising thereof.

Caste is too shallow for me. Change and criticisms would be genuine, if, and only if; there is an attempt to understand essence. Or, may be we will have to be mute spectators of "the burning house" that Louis Farrakhan speaks of (literally). Im afraid, our inability and unwillingness to understand issues to its core, and the reluctance to act would one day burn the house called Nepal we live in.

Let's listen to what this guy called Louis Farrakhan has to say. He is dismissed by many Black leaders for being too radical and confrontational but again, he sure has balls and no doubt he is a charismatic speaker. Lets hope, our Nation will never have the necessity to need a leader like him.

Good Luck.

State and religion should never go in parallel, that's what the conclusion is because, its complexity ends up in roaring racism where the notion of religiousity deteriorates.
just a thought

jaya matadi ji,

too hazy, ali spastha parnu huncha ki?

Farrrah khan is a misguided and yet convinced soul at the same time

what makes you think so birbhadra ji?

All ultra religious pundits are in that category

Birbhadra ji,

He speaks more than Nation of Islam. He is known more for his outrageous standing about Black rights in US. It wont harm you doing more research and then speak. Thanks.

For the underdogs: 'Periyar' E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker,
and Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar

Naturally, other castes, equally wealthy but not so well-read, resented this dominance. Even so, Brahmins may not have attracted so much opprobrium had they not carried their phobia of 'pollution' to extreme lengths. As notions of democracy and human equality spread, the inexcusable practice of untouchability towards the Dalits, the unwillingness to dine with other castes considered lowly, evoked an enormous backlash. Ambedkar led the battle for the Dalits; Periyar raised the banner of backward caste revolt in Tamil Nadu. "The castes which backed Periyar were hardly the wretched of the earth," said Gupta. "They were rich, powerful castes, unwilling to stomach Brahmin superiority."

The coming of Independence, and universal suffrage with it, irreversibly weakened the Brahmin's position. Suddenly this caste had to confront the fact that, for all its influence, its numbers were few: even in Uttar Pradesh, where Brahmins are most numerous, they constitute just 9 per cent. In Tamil Nadu they form less than 3 per cent. When the DMK, an offshoot of Periyar's Dravida Kazagham (DK), won power in 1967, the writing for Brahmins was on the wall. "Once the DMK took charge it embarked on a severe and systematic programme of reverse discrimination," said Sheth. "Reservation quotas were raised to such high levels that Brahmins were squeezed out of government-owned educational institutions and jobs."

Why did retribution take so much longer to reach north India? "In the south, caste battles were polarised between Brahmins and non-Brahmins," said Sheth. "In north India, not only were Brahmins more numerous, but there were also other upper castes with whom they could ally." Besides, added Gupta, the jajmani system of village economy lasted longer in the north than in the south. "As long as it existed, the power and influence of the landed Brahmin remained. But now that has collapsed in the north as well."

"The main reason Brahmins, especially in north India were able to preserve their position despite the coming of democracy," said Satish Deshpande of the Institute for Economic Growth, "was the peculiar naivetŽ and optimism of the Nehruvian era. At the time it was thought that as the country progressed, caste would just wither away. But in fact this approach only led to the perpetuation of inequality. A caste-blind polity also remained blind to the persistence of caste dominance!"

But not for ever. Thanks to reservations and reforms, there has been the rise of a substantial middle class among the scheduled castes and tribes; the Green Revolution of the sixties empowered sections of the backward castes; and finally, V.P. Singh's fateful decision led to the backward and Dalit assertion of the early 90s. As the frenzy of the anti-Mandal agitation showed, pure panic set in among the upper castes, especially Brahmins.

Yet the deluge never came. The Brahmins of north India have not been washed away. How did they stave off the backward class-Dalit threat? Politically, their sizeable numbers proved crucial. At 9 per cent, Brahmins are the largest caste in Uttar Pradesh after Jatavs (12 per cent). As castes like the Jats and the Yadavs have repeatedly proved, determined minorities can, in the electoral arena, aided by wealth, weapons and proper organisation, overcome the handicap of moderate numbers. Brahmins, too, have not shied away from using strong-arm methods to enforce their electoral will in the past, but defensive after the Mandal upheaval, they have lately restricted themselves, like the Muslims, to careful tactical voting.

"Across much of north India, Brahmins have joined forces with castes like Rajputs and Banias to form broadbased upper caste coalitions," said Sheth. "This is a recent development. In the past, before the backward classes became politically conscious, these upper castes, especially Brahmins and Thakurs, were the main rivals for state power." Such a coalition so augments their numbers that no political party can ignore them. But the upper castes have done more. "They have been very clever at exploiting the political and regional fragmentation of the backward castes to their advantage," observed Yogendra Yadav.

"Dalit intellectuals, mostly city-based, continue to rail against Brahmanvad," said Dalit intellectual Chandrabhan Prasad. "That is because they are in government service, or their Dalit friends are, and often suffer minor humiliations at the hands of upper caste officers, especially Brahmins. But the bulk of Dalits in the villages has realised that the main enemies of Dalits are not Brahmins. Their real oppressors are the intermediate and elite backward castes, who are the powerful landowners today." Agreed Sheth: "That is why an upper caste-Dalit coalition, though unstable, is at least possible, as we have seen in UP. It is proving more tenable than a backward-Dalit coalition."

Beyond politics, in the professional world, the Brahmin's main survival weapon has been their legacy of education. "Earlier Brahmins had status power," said Sheth. "Now that has gone. But the benefits they obtained on account of that status in the past-the education they received down several generations, in some cases vast amounts of land and money they came to possess-remain with them still."

From memorising mantras to memorising equations and formulae is, after all, not that large a leap. "Ingesting large amounts of data, doing well in exams, articulating a point of view cogently: these are all skills," said Deshpande. "Brahmins, through centuries of practice, possess these skills. The recently empowered castes are finding that such skills are not easy to acquire." A recent study on social mobility in the Economic and Political Review showed that "men from salaried backgrounds had far superior chances of reaching salaried destinations themselves than did men from any other background".

A good number of second generation employees do indeed owe their success to their hereditary academic ability; but not all. Like all other castes in India, Brahmins too network tirelessly to protect and promote their own. Brahmin bureaucrats denied it, insisting that the relationship between fellow Brahmins was usually one of rivalry rather than cooperation. But R.S. Khare's study of Kanakubja Brahmins of UP, The Changing Brahmins-which could well apply to all Brahmins-showed this is just not true. Khare cites a marvellous example of how a poor Kanakubja schoolteacher goes through five other Kanakubjas to finally approach the commissioner of his division, also a Kanakubja, and obtain a small-time job for his son.

What of the future? Brahmins may have held out so far, but they were far from optimistic. "It is still early years for the Mandal entrants," said a top BJP politician. "Ten years from now the upper castes will be finished in the north Indian bureaucracy as well." As soon as their confidence is won, upper caste bureaucrats embark on stories about the inefficiency and venality of backward caste and Dalit officers. "In coming years efficiency will plummet, the country will suffer terribly. I'm trying to send my children abroad," said a Brahmin joint secretary.

"Anti-reservation feeling is much stronger now among the upper castes than in the past," said Yogendra Yadav. "Some of the horror stories of poor performance may be true," admitted Dipankar Gupta. "But the other castes are also learning fast. The second generation of educated backwards and Dalits will be much more capable than the first."

Of course, there is always the private sector. As long as reservations remain confined to state-owned services, Brahmins can rejoice: for the private sector is expanding, while the state sector is shrinking. It may be mere coincidence, but the move away from increasing state control began in 1991, one year after the Mandal agitation. As second generation and third generation economic reforms follow, as more and more areas are privatised and more and more PSUs disinvested, Brahmin hegemony is likely to get a fresh lease of life. By the time the backwards and Dalits get to rule the state empire, they may find, like the later Mughal emperors, that there is little of the empire left to rule.


Caste figures
The last census in which caste figures as a category was conducted in 1931. It is, of course, hopelessly outdated. The map of the subcontinent has been drastically redrawn since then: one country has split into three; the princely states have disappeared; within each of the three countries boundaries of states have been repeatedly redrawn. Yet the figures relating to caste in this census still remain the only reliable figures available. In 1931, there were 1.5 crore Brahmins-4.32% of the total population.

Never-never coalition
Dalit-Brahmin alliance is an impossibility at present

By Kancha Ilaiah

Some Dalit writers have been arguing that the enmity between Dalits and Sudras/Other Backward Castes (OBCs) is more bitter than that between Dalits and Brahmins. Hence, they argue, a social coalition among Dalits and Brahmins is possible, particularly in the rural setting, where Brahmins have moved away from landed property.

Moreover, a section of Dalits live within Buddhist and Christian religious cultures. Hence, a Dalit-Brahmin coalition is possible if friendly relations between Brahminic Hinduism and Buddhist/Christian religions begin to operate.

In the case of Sudras/OBCs, the allegiance to Hinduism is still primitive. There is hardly any critical assessment of how Brahminism has darkened their identity. The Scheduled Caste (SC) intelligentsia had assessed this and chose an alternative path by carving out a definite identity for themselves. Ambedkar initiated that process in a big way.

The Dalit intellectuals who are talking about Dalit-Brahmin coalition do not theorise social relations based on historical experience. They do not discuss the spiritual realm at all. All their arguments flow from the basic concern about the economic development of Dalits. Nobody can dismiss these concerns, but economic issues form only part of the problems considered by Ambedkar. The uncritical and crude economic pursuits of Sudras/OBCs should not mislead the historical vision of Ambedkarites. This will have serious consequences in the process of socio-political change in India.
If we carefully examine the spiritual and cultural divide between the whole of Sudras/OBCs and the Dwija society, we can see that the common cultural ground between Sudras and Dalits is more visible than the common cultural ground between Dalits and Brahmins.

There is a basic difference between development of a section of society and transformation of the whole society. When Ambedkar targeted Brahminism and Hinduism, he had the transformation of Dalits and the rest of society in his scheme. He did not see the OBCs (at that time Sudras) as oppressors. He saw their caste consciousness as an imposed consciousness, not as one constructed by their historical self. Now we can see the productive cultural ethic between Dalits and OBCs as a common bonding. Such a bonding does not exist between Dalits and Brahmins. Brahmins as a caste operate completely within the sphere of non-productive elite economy. Their intellectuality is only a derived intellectuality, whereas the Dalit intellectuality is rooted in the processes of production.

Dalits have three great prophetic images-Buddha, Jesus and Ambedkar-to confront the Hindu divine images. As the spread of these images within the Dalit-Adivasi society increases, Brahmins would have no way but to recognise the socio-spiritual strength of Dalits. The OBCs neither owned these images nor did they construct their alternative images to improve their transformative abilities. That is the reason why the OBCs as a social category will not be able to challenge the Brahminic social order.

The reason is that there is philosophical poverty among the OBCs in particular and the Sudras in general. In Uttar Pradesh, BSP leader Kanshi Ram propagated the great alliance of Mahatma Phule, Ambedkar and Periyar. But the OBCs did not respond to this, because, at the religious level, they were hanging on to Hindu Brahminism even though their status in that religion is only as the 'feet born'. Though Dalits were forced to be untouchables and were poorer than the OBCs, in the recent past, their philosophical basis and identity have staged a come back.

The OBCs are in the primitive level. When a community is primitive in terms of its consciousness, it does not pose any threat to the oppressors, rather it remains a threat to its own self. This is the predicament of Sudras/OBCs. But what is the responsibility of the more conscious ideological forces that have come from the most oppressed in society? They must lead even the less conscious among the other oppressed, but not join hands with the oppressors and declare that the less conscious oppressed are more dangerous than the historical oppressors themselves. That leads to the end of Dalit ideology itself.

(Ilaiah is a Dalit intellectual and academic)
Courtesy/Deccan Herald

So why Islam?

jesus christ !!! where am I?

At peace,

http://www.cnn.com/video/player/player.html?url=/video/bestoftv/2007/03/09/lemon.farrakhan.intv.cnn