* edited version -usefull sampling working paper for preview on Nepal -  ref;

Understand Nepal:
 Western Views of the Maoist Insurgency
And the Royal Takeover

Peter Burleigh
Institute of Governmental Studies
University of California, Berkeley
February 2005

http://igov.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/index.html
 
NEPAL:
Western Views of the Maoist Insurgency
And the Royal Takeover

since the launching of the Maoist revolt in Nepal in 1996, there have been a
variety of reactions from Western countries.,because of this variety, propose that

such two sets of Western countries – the U.S./UK, on the one hand, and the

European Union (with its various members) on the other. and the third element

briefly review is the role of the United Nations in the Nepal crisis.
Appear to be two fundamental goals in both the U.S. and UK policies: (a)
help Nepal become a peaceful, more prosperous, and democratic nation and (b)
in the process, prevent the Maoists from attaining victory.
--by and large, the U.S./UK reaction has been multi-faceted, and has thus
included both increasing development assistance to the government, especially
since 2001, and increasing military assistance, both equipment and training.
--the U.S./UK, while sensitive to and acknowledging, human rights abuses on the
part of the Nepali police and the Royal Nepalese Army, has nonetheless been
providing enhanced military assistance.
--such assistance has included hardware and training; the training has included
extensive class-work in the necessity of the protection of civilians and education
in the international norms relating to the rights of non-combatants under
international conventions and laws.
--as for the U.S., starting especially after the events of 9/11, there has been a
worldwide agenda, which the U.S. Administration calls the “war on terrorism”.
--while not formally designating the Maoists as a terrorist group, the U.S. has
come very close to that appellation;
--and the U.S. and Nepal signed a formal agreement to cooperate on counter-
terrorism in 2002.
--while the U.S. has repeatedly commented on, and criticized, the human rights
practices of the government, as reflected in the police and army, it has been less
 
harsh and public in such condemnation – certainly in comparison to the UK and
the rest of the European Union.
--since 2001 the U.S. has also taken an unusually prominent role in focusing
development assistance donors on the needs of Nepal – and using its influence
with others to dramatically increase such assistance, at the same time that its
own levels of assistance continued to grow – even with the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq exerting more and more claim on U.S. resources.
--the U.K. also has substantially increased its military and development support
for Nepal, though not at the same level as the U.S.; the British, of course, also
have a much longer history of intimate relations with Nepal than the U.S.
--these steps by the U.S. and UK have distinguished those countries from the
European Union and the bilateral assistance programs from some of its
members, including importantly Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland.                 .
--that EU assistance, by and large, has been focused on traditional
developmental aid, though its scope has been reduced substantially since 2002
because of security concerns reflecting the continuing conflict, and the spreading
effectiveness of Maoist attacks countrywide.
--some specific EU projects have been targeted by the Maoists, apparently in the
expectation that such focused attacks would cause a diminution in such projects.
This expectation has proven accurate.in general too, it should be pointed out that the EU and its constituent units have publicly and privately focused substantial concern on the human rights
abuses rampant in Nepal.
--while most of the public statements on such abuses also cover criticism of the
Maoists, there is a general perception in Nepal that the EU has been more critical
of the government than of the insurgents.
--throughout the period since 2001, there has also been a very active, and
largely effective, effort to coordinate policy approaches to Nepal between India,
the UK and the U.S.
--both the British and U.S. Governments, in practice though seldom publicly,
recognize the primary role India plays with regard to Nepal.
--the recent statement by the U.S. Ambassador in Delhi that the U.S. was
expecting India to take the lead with regard to Nepal is unusual only in that he 
said it publicly.  Privately that has been the prevailing U.S. and UK view for
years.
--what this coordination has meant in practice is regular and intensive
consultations in Kathmandu, New Delhi, London, and Washington among the
three countries.  The Indian ambassador in Kathmandu confirmed this in his
February 25th press statement: “I think the international community, certainly
those that are seen as being involved in Nepal’s development, have shown an
impressive unity in their response to developments here and there has certainly
been frequent coordination.  We’ve had consultations with China also on this
situation”.
--and while it would be inaccurate to say that India holds an absolute veto power
over U.S. and UK assistance to Nepal, it would be unusual for either country to
proceed in its bilateral relationship with Nepal into areas in which the Indian
authorities objected.
--because of this triangular consultative and coordinating relationship, it is of
fundamental importance to understand India’s views of, and policies toward,
Nepal in any effort to understand the U.S. and UK roles.
--fortunately we have had a thorough review of the Indian view and I need not
go into it further except to point out with the return of a Congress Party
government in Delhi – and the return of Natwar Singh as Foreign Minister –
some of the understanding between Nepal and India which had developed
during a more forthcoming BJP government may be changing.
--after all, without exaggerating this inordinately, Nepal is the last Hindu
kingdom and the political ideologies of the BJP and Nepalese monarchy are, in
principle at least, much closer than those of the Congress and the monarch.
--there is also the awkward reality that India’s relations with all its neighbors
(except Bhutan) have often included a willingness to sponsor and/or turn a blind
eye to dissident movements which cause the neighbor to be weakened and thus,
in the Indian view, less likely to buck Indian orientation and advice.
--this has occurred many times in Indo-Nepal relations and the classic example is
the initial Indian support for the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.
--some U.S. officials believe that Indian attitudes today are more pragmatic and
that India earnestly seeks to help blunt, if not defeat, the Maoist threat to the
constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy.
--but, let’s get back to the U.S.
--at base, I think it is fair to say that the U.S. saw, and sees, the Maoist violence
as being fundamentally illegitimate, despite all the reasons which may motivate
Nepalis to join, and/or support, the insurgency.
--the violence directed by the Maoists against civilians and noncombatants, the
Maoists’ ideological compatibility with the Sundero Luminoso in Peru and the
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and, closer to home, the various Maoist/revolutionary
groups in central and northern India, and the general intention to radically
restructure Nepali society and even culture, are anathema to the U.S. (so forth with  the UK and India, ).
--the Maoists, for their counter  part, have made clear their intention to impose a one-
party “people’s republic”, collectivize agriculture, “re-educate class enemies, and
export their revolution to neighboring countries (read: especially India).
--having said all that, however, it has also been the consistent view of the U.S.
and UK that there cannot be a military solution to the Maoist insurgency.
--both publicly and privately the U.S. (and UK) have strongly advised the
Government of Nepal that there has to be a political solution to the Maoist
challenge; a solution that would include the Maoists, the democratic political
parties, and the king.
--it is in that context, that is of strengthening the hand of the government in its
future political negotiations with the Maoists, that the U.S., and UK, military
assistance has been internally justified.
--the thinking has gone that a more effective government security force would
be more likely to convince the Maoist leadership that they cannot win militarily
and should strike a deal, and somehow or other, move into the peaceful political
mainstream of Nepal.

REACTING TO THE KING’S COUP
--all things considered I think that King Gyanendra has made a colossal blunder
in taking over direct control of the Government of Nepal on February 1st
 
--it is conventional, but accurate, to note that by doing so he has eliminated the
protective barrier which the elected governments have provided him since his
ascension to the throne after the palace massacre in 2001.
--more than his brother, King Birendra, or his father or grandfather, Gyanendra
has needed that protection because his legitimacy has been in question as theirs
was not.
--although this is now a work in progress, precisely that Gyanendra has also
wrongly assessed how the major traditional democratic friends of Nepal (UK, US
and India) would react to his coup.
--while it is impossible for us to know his innermost calculations, it appears that
he assessed that the three democracies would have no choice but to continue to
support him – and, through him, the Royal Nepalese Army, the armed police,
and the regular police, lest the Maoists gain further ground.
--presumably he calculated that even if the Western countries, and India, were
unhappy with his seizure of power, that they would gradually come to realize
that they had no option but to support him, since reacting with pressure against
his move would benefit the Maoists, which none of them wishes to strengthen.
In other words, he may have thought that he had outmaneouvered the
democracies and left them no  choice but to continue their support.
--however, in this he may have miscalculated.
--as of today, however, both the British and the Indians have implemented a
freeze in military cooperation.
--the U.S. has made no such public announcement, but appears to have given
the King a short timeframe in which to undo most of his Feb. 1st
proclamation,
importantly freeing political leaders, the press, and allowing the legal political
parties to function openly again.  Meanwhile, there is reportedly “nothing” in the
military pipeline.
--at least in these first five weeks after the Feb. 1st action, Gyanendra has had to
depend on support from China and Pakistan.  His Defense Secretary implied as
much February 25, when he suggested that an arms cutoff from the West and
India would force Nepal to turn north and west.
--Presumably Gyanendra and his advisors have calculated that there is leverage
to be gained with India by threatening closer association with either or both  of
these countries.   And also presumably, he may have calculated that through
India, both the UK and US would reduce their opposition to his move, for 
reasons thereafter  noted earlier regarding the trilateral cooperation, with India in thelead on Nepal.
--conscience to a substancy judgment is that this is another very serious miscalculation by the k ing: no but has to do  that India is likely to capitulate; rather, it is more likely to increase pressure on Nepal, which it can do in so many ways.The classic Indian method, of course, is to say nothing publicly, but to
dramatically reduce the v olume of goods transiting India to Nepal.  Until very
recently, ironically, the Maoists have been doing this anyway, with their major
highway blockade, so that India hasn’t had to take action in order to create the
same effect.further, forseen  that China is interested in playing a substantial anti-
Indian game in Nepal under current circumstances.  The Chinese are already
embarrassed by their “Maoist” problem in Nepal. on the other hand, the Pakistanis, through their military intelligence agency, may be inclined to
seek additional ways to cause internal problems in India, and Nepal has always
had that potential.--but this is an extremely dangerous game for Nepal to be

playing and crisped guess that, even if the King is so inclined, he will desist

shortly from this path.Make to matters any such Nepal-Pakistan effort would

also be anathema to the U.S and UK and,if anything, would harden their

positions vis a vis the King.  Both would also seek to use their influence on Pakistan.

 

WHAT ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS?
Or other 3rd Party Negotiators?

--outsiders have wondered for years why the United Nations or an interested,
but “neutral” Scandanavian country like Norway  couldn’t play a useful role as a
mediator or, at least, facilitator of political negotiations between the

Government of Nepal and the Maoists.

Flush to the question is:  India. ~when the Indian ambassador in Kathmandu

was asked about UN mediation February 25th , this was his reply: “A 3rd party

brings in more complications, my government does not see at the moment the

need to muddy the water further”.--the slightly longer answer is:  the King
 
--they have different, but in some areas overlapping, rationales: India wants to
continue to be the major outside influence on developments in Nepal and a 3rd

party mediator risks, from the Indian perspective, getting out of control – and
heading off in a direction which India does not support.
--further, it will surprise some listeners, but India has a consistent record of
opposing United Nations involvement in South Asia.  Presumably because of its
international legitimacy, the U.N. is considered a wild card – and one which
might go public in areas where India would prefer secrecy or, at least, plausible
deniability.  The UN might take substantive positions inimical to Indian interests,
as seen from Delhi at least.
--as for the King, any mediation setting which would appear to equate his
standing, as monarch and now head of government, with the Maoist leaders
would be unacceptable.
--the only exception to this general rule evolved, is if there were secret
negotiations which resulted in some sort of Monarch/Maoist agreement to jointly
rule, and to exclude the democratic political parties.
--the only overlapping political interests  between the Maoists and the king,
is the shared desire to exclude the democratic political parties from power.
--but it is very hard to conceive of such an arrangement.
--just briefly, as for another 3rd party, like Norway or Sweden, provoked the same problems would be foreseen by the Indians.  While they have agreed to such a role for Norway in Sri Lanka, that situation while important to India is not of the same degree of immediate national security interest as Nepal.
--and, unless he were truly desperate, hesitantly the king would have the same sort of problem with such a mediation as mentioned above.
 

 

nice find natyavaruval, thank you

You are almost wellcome spoiled.. Jai Nepal,  Nepal le man ..  bahhu sikshya.