Article in Times of India
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1094146,curpg-2.cms

India's decision to resume milita-ry assistan-ce to the king betrays a lack of pr-udent judgment. Leaving aside moral and democratic issues and focusing purely on the strategic aspects, the decision is just so much wasted money, material and hope. The RNA is nothing more than a private army of the king, funded by the people of Nepal without their consent.

India, the US and the UK have assiduously nursed this force to help it combat an insurgency that is largely reliant on a limited arsenal of crude weapons and seized ordnance. Thanks to foreign generosity, the RNA's numbers increased from 58,000 in 2001 to about 80,000 in 2005. With the introduction of the unified-command, including police and armed police, the counter-insurgency has a total deployment strength of 1,40,000. Against this, the insurgents have a core troop strength of between 6,000-8,000, supplemented by a poorly-equipped militia of between 20-25,000. In terms of the numerical asymmetry of the main fighting force, the counter-insurgents outnumber the insurgents 10:1. As for hardware capability, the insurgents possess a large quantity of easily replenishable devices unknown to the conventional military arsenal, and some sophisticated weapons seized from the state's armoury. By contrast, since 2001, India, the US and the UK have, in the course of helping it, reduced the RNA to a state of complete hardware dependency by foisting on it irrelevant sophisticated equipment that requires the continuous inflow of supplies and fuel.

In the years since the RNA was upgraded from a ceremonial force into an alleged fighting machine, complete with 20,000 M16 automatic rifles, and other such equipment unsuitable for counter-insurgency operations, it has managed to lose ground to an ill-armed guerrilla force. The more the counter-insurgency was armed, the more the insurgency gained.

Assistance to RNA runs into hundreds of crores as against a Maoist military budget that is a tiny fraction of this. Further assistance from India will not reverse the trend, considering India's own reco-rd of dealing with insurgency. The IPKF fled from battle after a dismal rout in Sri Lanka. The Indian army's abject failure in the north-east has been reaffirmed over decades. Moreover, India's image in Nepal is nothing to boast of. Help from India will not quell the insurgency in Nepal.

Friends of the king will merely strengthen the military against an unarmed population and terrorise it into submitting to the will of a tyrant. The RNA has a heroic record of killing civilians. In the circumstances, wholesale slaughter by both sides can be expected. India needs to cultivate new friends in Nepal in other ways.