A fired computer engineer for Fannie Mae has been arrested and
charged with planting a malicious software script designed to
permanently destroy millions of dollars worth of data from all 4,000
servers operated by the mortgage giant.
Rajendrasinh Babubahai Makwana, 35, of Virginia, concealed the Unix
script on Fannie Mae's main administrative server on October 24, the
same day the Unix engineer was terminated, according to court documents
made public Tuesday. His script was programmed to remain dormant for
three months, when it would greet administrators with a login message
that read "Server Graveyard" and systematically replace all data with
zeros on every production, administrative, and backup server in the
company.
Makwana was arrested on January 7 and released on $100,000 bond. He
faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and is scheduled to be
arraigned on Friday. Attempts to reach him and his attorney for comment
were not successful. As a contract employee at Fannie's Urbana,
Maryland data center for about three years, Makwana had unfettered root
access to the entire company's system.
The plot laid out in a nine-page criminal complaint can fairly be
described as vicious, even in the high-stress world of IT
administration, where sabotage by disgruntled employees is common. Had
his malicious script remained undetected, it would have wiped out
millions of mortgage records just as the meltdown in the US housing
market is reaching the boiling point.
The allegations also lay out a cautionary tale about the risk of lax
security practices at highly sensitive enterprises. Despite his
dismissal on October 24, Makwana's highly privileged computer access
wasn't terminated until late into the evening because of bureaucratic
procedures in Fannie's procurement department, according to court
documents.
Shortly after Makwana was informed he was being fired, he logged in
to Fannie's main development server and embedded a series of malicious
scripts inside a legitimate program. To conceal the malicious payload,
he created a page worth of blank lines between the legitimate code and
the malicious code.
"When the program ascertained it was January 31, 2009, it would copy
the rest of the files from the '.soti' file from the dsysadm01 server
and run the .y.sh script," a FBI special agent wrote in a sworn
statement that referred to Fannie as ABC to protect its identity. "The
.y.sh script would place a blocker on the monitoring system disabling
any ABC engineers from receiving a monitoring alert for any problems on
any machines in the entire ABC environment for 61 minutes."
Makwana's script would then disable logins to Fannie's
administrative and backup production servers; remove the root password
appliance access; rewrite all data, including backup software, with
zeros; and target any "high availability" software. It would then
replicate itself to each of Fannie's 4,000 servers.
For thoroughness, the script would then execute all over again on a
separate administrative server in case some of the company's servers
couldn't be reached from the first one.
"Had this malicious script executed, ABC engineers expect it would
have caused millions of dollars of damage and reduced if not shutdown
operations at ABC for a least one week," the FBI agent wrote. "If this
script were executed, the total damage would include cleaning out and
restoring all 4,000 ABC servers, restoring and securing the automation
of mortgages, and restoring all data that was erased."
It was only by chance that a senior engineer at Fannie stumbled on
to the script five days after Makwana's dismissal, the agent stated.
The allegations demonstrate the awesome powers vested in a single,
well-placed IT administrator, who with a few hundred keystrokes has the
ability to wreak substantial damage on an entire economy. It also
shines a light on the evil genius of an alleged disgruntled employee
who took great pains to cover his footprints from forensics
investigators he almost certainly knew would pore over the case later.
Like so many other saboteurs, though, Makwana also appeared to make
careless mistakes. He allegedly planted his malicious script via a
secure shell login from his Fannie-issued laptop using an IP address
Fannie had assigned to him.
Shortly before planting the script, Makwana - a native of India who
was employed by an unknown IT outsourcing firm - also emailed relatives
in that country using a Fannie address and told them not to return to
the US. ®